Criminal Procedure--Right to Counsel--Necessity that Defendant Have Aid of an Accountant in a Complex Tax Prosecution by Soyars, Tom
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 8
1955
Criminal Procedure--Right to Counsel--Necessity




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Soyars, Tom (1955) "Criminal Procedure--Right to Counsel--Necessity that Defendant Have Aid of an Accountant in a Complex Tax
Prosecution," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 44 : Iss. 4 , Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol44/iss4/8
KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL
be presumed. It remains to be seen whether the "presumed accept-
ance" in this case will be reaffirmed and applied to any donee bene-
ficiary.
LEsia W. MomUS II
CmmIINAL PROCEDURE-RIGirT TO CouNsEL-NECEssrrY THAT DEND~m'r
HAVE Am OF AN ACCOUNTANT IN A COMPLEX TAx PRosEcUTnoN-De-
fendant, a notorious gambler, was indicted for filing false and fraudu-
lent income tax returns. Defendant had no assets at the time of in-
dictment or at the time of trial, since all his property was subject to
jeopardy assessments and tax liens in favor of the Treasury Depart-
ment.' It was undisputed that the services of a skilled accountant
were necessary in order to prepare an effective defense. The trial
court, therefore, ordered the government to release some of defendant's
funds to enable him to hire an accountant. The government having
refused to do so, the trial court dismissed the indictment. United
States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wisc. 1955).
The trial court's opinion contains an excellent summary of the law
which has been developed on the Constitutional right of a defendant
to have counsel for his defense.2 Viewing the instant case in the light
of the recent enlargements of the constitutional right to counsel,3 the
Court felt justified in extending protection to the defendant. In reach-
ing this result, the Court was forced to distinguish the case of O'Con-
nor v. United States,4 a case reaching a contrary result. The Court
did this on the grounds that in the O'Connor case the defendant's
funds, though attached at the time of the trial, has been unencum-
bered for some twenty-two months after the indictment, and that the
defendant had therefore had adequate time to hire accounting help
before his funds were, in effect, attached.
The Court's primary reason for its position was the apparent un-
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, sec. 3670-3672. (Now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
sec. 6321-6326, 6331.)
2 Most of the Court's discussion, however, centered around the 'lack of due
process" inherent in the government's action here. In other words the Court
views the case primarily as a Fifth Amendment case, rather that as a Sixth Amend-
ment case, although the Constitutional right to counsel, in the Federal courts is
granted by the latter Amendment. It is believed this was caused by the fact that
most of the cases discussed were state cases, brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which like the Fifth, contains a "due process" clause.
3 In the opinion of the writer, it is of considerable significance that the trend
in the law has been to broaden the scope of this particular constitutional right. In
conjunction with both this footnote and footnote 2, see Note, 44 Ky. L.J. 103
(1955) and note, 38 Ky. L.J. 317 (1950).
4 203 F. 2d 301 (4th Cir. 1953).
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fairness of the government's action. The Court excoriated the govern-
ment for prosecuting the defendant with one arm, the Justice Depart-
ment, while simultaneously permitting another arm, the Treasury De-
partment, to deprive the defendant of an effective defense by im-
pounding his funds. In the language of the Court, this constituted
"holding and hitting.", One need not be the Marquis of Queensbury
to perceive that by the use of this boxing term, the Court was ac-
cusing the government of "unsportsmanlike conduct," or to revert to
legal parlance, of "denying the defendant due process of law."
The Court affirmed the decision and refused to procure an ac-
countant for the defendant under the court's power to appoint, and
pay, witnesses." The Court pointed out that expert witnesses are re-
quired by law to appraise both sides of any findings made, a pro-
cedure which the Court felt would amount to the use of discovery
process against a criminal defendant, and a possible violation of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. 7
It is believed that the Court in the instant case reached the proper
result. The appointment of counsel must be more than a mere formal
appointment of counsel." Effective counsel is required.9 Counsel, no
matter how competent, could not adequately prepare a defense with-
out the assistance of an accountant. It seem eminently just that no
trial should be held unless the defendant can procure the assistance
his counsel might require in preparing his defense. Unfortunately,
this broad generalization is, of course, not the law.
While justice would require that the indigent defendant be given
the material for preparing his defense, abstract justice has, as so often
happens, yielded to practicality and to a certain penuriousness in the
body politic. The problem of who would pay for such assistance is
inevitably raised, and the answer is difficult, though it might not be
entirely frivolous to reply that a government which can spend billions
and billions of dollars for the benefit of foreign nations, farmers, and
many other groups (and no disparagement of any of these expendi-
tures is intended) might well spend an infinitesimally smaller sum for
adequately protecting the civil liberties of its own impecunious
citizens.
5 U.S. v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158, 163 (E.D. Wisc. 1955).
6 FE. R. Cumn. P. 28
7 U.S. v. Brodson, supra note 5, at 166. The Court was unmoved by the gov-
ernment's offer to waive its right to any information obtained. The Court felt that
since the language of the statute was mandatory, and required the expert witness
to give his findings to both sides, he would be unauthorized to collect his ex-
penses for such unilateral action. Ibid.
8 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
9Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the leading case on the subject;
Avery v. Alabama, 808 U.S. 444 (1940) (dictum).
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It will be observed that the holding of the instant case avoids this
problem. In this type of case, the defendant pays for his own defense.
In requiring the government to release some of the defendant's money
from its custody, the court is not requiring the government to actually
hire the accountant. The government would merely released some
of the security it was holding to guarantee that the defendant's taxes
would be paid. At the worst, the government will be in exactly the
same position it was in before it attached the defendant's property.
Assuming that the defendant must "owe" either the government or an
accountant, it seems preferable, in this case, that he owe the govern-
ment since the opposite answer will virtually mean that the defendant
won't be able to get the accounting assistance he requires to prepare
his defense.' 0
It is therefore the writer's belief that in spite of the over-all tone
of the opinion, the instant case should not be taken as a radical ex-
tension of the right to counsel as the concept has developed in this
country. The writer, being in favor of the broadest possible extension
of the right to counsel apparently guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment, is naturally in accord with the result reached in this case.
Whenever at all feasible, the courts should see that the rights of a
defendant are not unduly prejudiced because of his poverty. "Equal
justice for rich and poor" is more than a Fourth of July platitude; it is
one of the cornerstones of any democratic society.
Tom Soy~ns
ESTATE TAXAToN-CoNsTrrTIONALrrY OF THE PRE!IUm PAYMIENT
TEST APPLIED TO LIFE INsURANCE PomCIEs WHEN GuIT TAx HAS BEEN
PAMe ON INTER Vrvos TRANsFER-In 1921, the insured procured insur-
ance policies upon his life and paid the annual premiums accruing
thereon until 1941. Then he assigned all his rights in the policies to
his three children, retaining to himself no title, interest, or possible
right of reversion. He filed a gift tax return for that year, reported the
transfer of the insurance policies, and paid the gift tax due thereon.
All premiums on the policies accruing subsequent to the transfer
were paid by the children. At the time of the insured's death, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue included in his gross taxable estate
that portion of the value of the policies represented by the proportion
that the premiums paid by the insured bore to the total amount of all
the premiums. The children paid the tax on this amount, and then
10 It must also be remembered that, because of the nature of a tax claim the
government is in an infinitely better position than the accountant, a mere creditor,
to actually realize on its claim.
